

1 Hearing Date: April 5, 2024
2 Hearing Time: 1:30 pm
3 Judge/Calendar: Judge Anne Egeler

4
5
6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
7 IN AND FOR THE COUNT OF THURSTON

8 LEWIS COUNTY, a Washington County;
9 SKAGIT COUNTY, a Washington County;
10 and AMERICAN FOREST RESOURCE
11 COUNCIL, a non-profit corporation,

12 Plaintiffs,

13 v.

14 WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF
15 NATURAL RESOURCES, an agency of the
16 State of Washington; and RECREATION,
17 CONSERVATION, AND TRANSACTIONS
18 DIVISION MANAGER KRISTEN OHLSON-
19 KIEHN, in the official capacity,

20 Defendants,
21 And

22 WASHINGTON CONSERVATION ACTION
23 EDUCATION FUND, a non-profit
24 corporation; CONSERVATION
NORTHWEST, a non-profit corporation;
OLYMPIC FOREST COALITION, a non-
profit corporation,

Defendant-Intervenors

Case No.: 22-2-03245-34

DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS' RESPONSE
BRIEF

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. BACKGROUND 2

 A. Carbon storage and sequestration.....3

 B. Carbon credits and markets.....7

 C. Effects of earning carbon credits.....7

III. ARGUMENT 8

 A. The Project advances and is consistent with DNR’s constitutional mandate to serve “all the people” and its common law duties to enumerated beneficiaries.....9

 B. The Project complies with the Department’s statutory obligations.....11

 C. Plaintiffs’ SEPA arguments fail.....13

 1. DNR adequately considered impacts to the environment, and SEPA does not provide a forum to impose policy preferences.....14

 2. DNR correctly carried out SEPA at the earliest possible time and Plaintiffs’ site-specific concerns are premature.....16

 3. SEPA is an environmental statute that does not require analysis of economic impacts.....18

IV. CONCLUSION..... 20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Chuckanut Conservancy v. Dep't of Nat. Res., 156 Wash. App. 274, 232 P.3d 1154 (2010) 15

Conservation Nw. v. Comm'r of Pub. Lands, 199 Wn.2d 813, 514 P.3d 174 (2022) 2, 9, 10

Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995)..... 16

Hood Canal Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Goldmark, 195 Wn.App. 284, 381 P.3d 95 (2016)..... 18

King Cnty. v. Washington State Boundary Rev. Bd. for King Cnty., 122 Wn.2d 648, 860 P.2d 1024 (1993)..... 17

Kucera v. State, Dep't of Transp., 140 Wash. 2d 200, 995 P.2d 63 (2000)..... 20

Samish Indian Nation v. Washington Dep't of Licensing, 14 Wash. App. 2d 437, 471 P.3d 261 (2020)..... 20

State v. Larson, 184 Wn.2d 843, 365 P.3d 740 (2015)..... 13

Wild Fish Conservancy v. Washington Dep't of Fish & Wildlife, 198 Wn.2d 846, 502 P.3d 359 (2022)..... 14, 15

Statutes

RCW 43.21C.020(3) 19

RCW 43.21C.030(a) 19

RCW 43.21C.030(b) 18, 20

RCW 79.10.120 13

RCW 79.10.210 10

RCW 79.10.320 12

RCW 79.10.330 12

1 RCW 79.13.010 2, 13, 20

2 RCW 79.13.010(1)..... 18

3 RCW 79.22.050 2, 13, 18

4 **Other Authorities**

5 Washington State Constitution, article XVI, section 1 9

6 **Regulations**

7 WAC 197-110-055(4)..... 17

8 WAC 197-11-055(1)..... 17, 18

9 WAC 197-11-335..... 19

10 WAC 197-11-444(2)(d) 19

11 WAC 197-11-704(2)(b)(iii) 17

12 WAC 197-11-800(5)(c) 18

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant-Intervenors Washington Conservation Action Education Fund, Conservation Northwest, and Olympic Forest Coalition respond to Plaintiffs’ opening brief. In furtherance of judicial economy and in accordance with this Court’s order granting intervention, Defendant-Intervenors generally support the Department of Natural Resource (Department or DNR) response, endeavor not to repeat arguments, and focus this brief on additional arguments and facts from the record.

The agency action at issue is the Department’s programmatic decision to pursue leases for carbon credits on a modest portion of public forestlands managed by the agency (the “Project”). Plaintiffs argue that pursuit of carbon leases is outside of the Department’s statutory authority and conflicts with the sustainable harvest statutes. This argument amounts to a radical contention that the Department must, as a matter of law, pursue logging on all operable Department-managed lands. No legal authority imposes a logging requirement on the Department. To the contrary, the Department has an obligation to balance the various benefits of public forests, and broad discretion in how it chooses to do so.

The Washington State Constitution, article XVI, section 1 requires that “[a]ll the public lands granted to the state are held in trust for all the people.” While the Department also has trust obligations to generate revenue or other benefits for enumerated institutional beneficiaries, the recent Washington State Supreme Court decision *Conservation Northwest v. Commissioner of Public Lands* instructs that the Department may serve those beneficiaries with non-financial benefits, and the Department has discretion in balancing the interests of the public and the enumerated beneficiaries. According to the Court, “[t]here appear to be myriad ways DNR could choose to generate revenue from the state and forest board lands or otherwise put them to use for

1 the benefit of the enumerated beneficiaries.” *Conservation Nw. v. Comm’r of Pub. Lands*, 199
2 Wn.2d 813, 835, 514 P.3d 174, 186 (2022).

3 In accordance with its broad authorities and discretion under the constitution and
4 common law, the Department has broad statutory authority to enter leases for nearly any purpose
5 that achieves fair market value. RCW 79.13.010; RCW 79.22.050. The sustainable harvest
6 statutes cited by Plaintiffs are planning statutes that ensure that public lands are not logged too
7 intensively or unsustainably. These planning statutes contain specific measures allowing for
8 adjustments of the planned harvest level as policies and circumstances change, and provisions to
9 address an outcome in which the planned volume is not obtained. The sustainable harvest
10 statutes do not mandate logging of a minimum volume or on any specific parcels.

11 With respect to the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) arguments, Plaintiffs
12 fundamentally mischaracterize the nature and scope of the challenged action. In an appropriate
13 and lawful measure, the Department solicited public notice and comment and conducted review
14 under SEPA on the Project at the earliest possible time. As a result, the Project is still in its
15 infancy. It may involve up to a maximum 10,000 acres of leases—but the briefing and record
16 reflects that those leases have not yet occurred. If the leases do occur, site specific market and
17 trust analysis is required by law, and Plaintiffs will be able to pursue site-specific legal challenge
18 as appropriate. Likewise, a developer or market is not finally identified. Given those
19 uncertainties and future legally required analysis, the thorough procedural steps and transparent
20 public process undertaken by the Department are more than adequate.

21 II. BACKGROUND

22 The history of the Project is set forth in the Department’s response and not repeated here.
23

1 Plaintiffs improperly attempt to turn a case largely based on the State Environmental Policy Act
2 into an evidentiary proceeding about the question of how best to store carbon and sequester
3 carbon in forests. That is not the posture of this case. This case turns on: 1) whether DNR has
4 the legal authority to initiate a program to lease a subset of DNR-managed lands for sale of
5 carbon credits, and 2) whether DNR clearly erred and violated SEPA when performing
6 environmental review of a project that involves entering 40-year leases at some point in the
7 future, in which the leases would preserve the environmental status quo on up to approximately
8 10,000 acres of forests.

9 To answer those limited questions, some limited additional factual background on carbon
10 storage and sequestration provides helpful context.

11 **A. Carbon storage and sequestration**

12 DNR manages approximately two million acres of forests, which constitute a
13 tremendously valuable public resource. They provide many public values including protecting
14 and enhancing air quality, water quality and quantity, fisheries and shellfisheries, wildlife
15 habitat, recreation, foraging, and other benefits. The areas with potential to be selected for the
16 Project are those screened for particularly high conservation value. REC 60-61.

17 While the overall benefits of DNR-managed lands are invaluable and challenging to
18 quantify, one economic analysis has concluded that the “ecosystem service value” of DNR-
19 managed forests is about \$1.2 billion. REC 3316, 6604. In addition, DNR’s forests have an
20 annual recreation value of almost \$1 billion, and a total “social cost of carbon” value of between
21 \$16.56 and \$19 billion. REC 3316; 6591. The “social cost of carbon is an estimate of the cost, in
22 dollars, of the damage that would be done by each additional ton of carbon emissions.

23 Conversely, it is an estimate of the benefit of action taken to reduce a ton of carbon emissions.”

1 REC 6669-70. According to scientific literature, “[t]he moist forests of the Pacific Northwest
2 United States are among the most naturally carbon rich ecoregions in the world.” REC 14456.
3 DNR’s forests have such high values because its vast forests both store and sequester carbon.
4 While Plaintiffs conflate these two concepts, there are important distinctions.

5 Carbon storage refers to the carbon held in a tree’s roots, associated soil, trunk, and
6 branches. More than 20 percent of the carbon stored in a tree is below ground, with significant
7 additional carbon stored in forest soils. *See* REC-017543; REC-014458. Absent logging, carbon
8 storage continuously increases throughout a tree’s life. Trees common in the Pacific Northwest,
9 such as Douglas fir and western red cedar, can live for hundreds of years or longer. REC 14464.
10 Natural forests typically feature trees of a variety of species and ages, with abundant downed
11 wood. After a tree dies and falls to the forest floor, it releases some carbon as it decays, but
12 continues to store other carbon in its remaining structures and soil. As the tree decays, some
13 carbon is slowly released into the air and other carbon is returned to the soil, which helps fuel
14 future growth of new trees. Through this long process, mature forests store vast reserves of
15 carbon. *See* REC 906 (SHC analysis of carbon storage). Carbon storage occurs in soils, downed
16 wood, and live trees. *See generally*, REC 17536-60 (white paper discussing carbon storage on
17 DNR-managed lands).

18 In contrast, if logging occurs, carbon storage in trees is dramatically reduced. Nearly all
19 the trees in a harvested area (for DNR-managed lands, typically 100 to 200 acres) are cut and
20 killed at once. The carbon stored in wood is not fully carried into forest products. While
21 estimates vary depending on species, products, and other factors, one study states that up to 40%
22 of the harvested wood does not become a product, and cautions that wood products themselves
23

1 decay over time, resulting in product accumulation much smaller than the total amount
2 harvested. REC 14725.

3 As detailed in extensive literature, *see* REC 14723-33 and associated citations, logging
4 operations also involve significant emissions. Logging is an industrial operation that requires
5 operation of heavy machinery for road building, cutting trees, stripping the tree of branches to
6 just the bole (merchantable portion of the trunk), skidding boles to landings, loading them, and
7 hauling them to the mill. Mill operations involve further machinery and associated emissions. A
8 percentage of each bole is turned into lumber, while a percentage is scrap that often is either
9 burned on site to generate electricity or turned into fuels such as wood pellets. The lumber is
10 then shipped again to the store and the end user. Every stage of the production process involves
11 significant emissions.

12 Following logging, machinery is used to unearth root balls and stack them along with
13 discarded limbs and sections of unused trees into piles, called slash piles. These piles are
14 allowed to dry and then burned. Because the process depletes soil nutrients, fertilizer is often
15 spread. Replanting nurseries require heating and cooling, and crews drive to the site and plant
16 small trees. Following replanting, herbicides are spread, often by plane or helicopter. Every
17 aspect of this process causes carbon emissions compared to unlogged conditions. *See* REC 908
18 (totaling emissions from forest operations) REC 14726 (chart showing lifecycle analysis of wood
19 products).

20 In contrast, forests that are preserved for longer rotations or in perpetuity store nearly all
21 their carbon and logging emissions are foregone. As a result, the consensus of scientific
22 literature and DNR's past environmental reviews is that land management schemes that involve
23 reduced logging, or logging on longer rotations, store far more carbon than forests managed for

1 logging. “[W]hen both above and belowground carbon stocks are considered, old-growth forests
2 can be found to store an average of 50 percent more carbon than managed forests on some sites.”
3 REC 14465. Throughout the scientific literature on carbon forestry, “it is agreed that managing
4 for longer rotations and older, more diverse forest conditions would enhance in-forest carbon
5 storage levels.” REC 14457.

6 The emissions impacts of logging are not cured by replanting. “While it is theoretically
7 possible that a replacement forest will grow and absorb a like amount of CO₂ to that emitted
8 decades or a century before, there is no guarantee that this will happen, and the enforcement is
9 transferred to future generations. In any rational economic analysis, a benefit in the distant future
10 must be discounted against the immediate damage associated with emissions during
11 combustion.” REC 14730.

12 The second concept is carbon sequestration. This concerns the active process of a tree
13 absorbing carbon from the atmosphere. Trees continuously sequester carbon throughout their
14 lives. While this process occurs at changing rates over time, it is additive—continual carbon
15 sequestration results in ever-increasing carbon storage. *See* REC 17560.

16 Considering these two concepts, entering into carbon leases for 40 years provides a
17 mechanism by which the Department can pause and lengthen logging rotations to enhance
18 carbon storage and sequestration, while preserving options for potential future forestry or other
19 uses of the lands. *See* REC 17422-17426 (Seattle Times editorial from Washington
20 Conservation Action and Conservation Northwest explaining carbon benefits of longer rotation
21 forestry); REC 1150 (discussion of benefits of diversification of assets). Based on our region’s
22 abundant rains and rich soils, studies have concluded that preserving forests in the Pacific
23 Northwest is a critical opportunity to offset and mitigate the impacts of climate change. REC

1 17409-11. The record in this case contains references to hundreds of technical papers discussing
2 and documenting the relative benefits of preserving forests, managing forests for carbon storage,
3 and managing them actively for various approaches to logging, all of which DNR relied on in
4 making its carbon leasing decision. *See* REC 8463 to REC 17446 (studies relied upon).

5 **B. Carbon credits and markets**

6 There are government-run carbon markets and voluntary carbon markets. While no
7 system is perfect, both are well-established and highly prescriptive and controlled. Plaintiffs
8 characterize voluntary carbon markets and credits as unregulated. To the contrary, the markets
9 and methodologies being considered by the Department, including the American Carbon
10 Registry standard and Improved Forest Management protocol, are highly scrutinized, require
11 regular verification, and include mechanisms to account for fire risk. *See* REC 17518-17521.

12 **C. Effects of earning carbon credits**

13 Contrary to Plaintiffs' contention, selling carbon credits does not necessarily **lead** to
14 additional pollution; it allows entities to purchase "credits" to **offset** their pollution. In that way,
15 the owners of natural climate solutions, such as forests, are paid by the market to maintain
16 existing emissions for social, business, or regulatory reasons. In voluntary carbon markets,
17 buyers are electing to purchase the credits, generally as part of a sustainability strategy. This
18 means that they are not buying or earning the right to increased emissions, and there is no causal
19 link between purchase of a credit and increased emissions.

20 Plaintiffs' characterization of lands managed for carbon storage and sequestration is also
21 inaccurate and unsupported. Carbon verification systems seek to protect forest assets. They
22 therefore encourage fuels management and allow light thinning, which can both enhance carbon
23 sequestration for remaining trees and reduce fire risk. Carbon verification systems also require a

1 buffer pool as insurance—these consist of extra offset credits that are reserved as backup in case
2 of wildfire. “The buffer pool is an insurance mechanism into which [credited] forest projects
3 contribute offsets based on a project-specific risk reversal analysis. Most projects contribute 16-
4 20% of their gross [credits] into the buffer pool to completely insure projects against
5 unintentional reversals.” REC 17520. This effectively provides extra carbon storage and
6 sequestration and insulates against climate impacts of fire on the leased forestlands.

7 III. ARGUMENT

8 The Department has broad discretion as a manager of almost six million acres of public
9 lands, including approximately two million acres of forests. Leasing forestlands for forty years
10 to generate revenue and allow for other uses, while preserving the forest asset for future
11 consideration, is well within the bounds of the Department’s discretion. The Department has
12 clear constitutional, statutory, and common law authority to lease forestlands to obtain carbon
13 offset credits. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ baseless claims, no law, regulation, or policy requires the
14 Department to pursue logging on all available forests. Numerous statutes expressly allow
15 Department-managed lands to be leased, set aside, and/or managed for multiple uses.

16 Plaintiffs’ SEPA claims also fail. The timing and scope of the claims are wrong. With
17 respect to timing, SEPA requires the Department to engage in environmental review “at the
18 earliest possible time.” Programmatic, non-project review is encouraged to prevent
19 “snowballing,” in which environmental review is delayed until after a decision has so much
20 momentum it is effectively predetermined. Here, the Department did exactly what SEPA
21 requires—conduct environmental review at the earliest possible time, at a programmatic level.
22 The only decision made thus far is to proceed with a carbon leasing program and tentatively
23 identify candidate forests. Given that the Department’s SEPA review does not include any

1 specific leases, the level of site-specific detail in the SEPA checklist and DNS is entirely
2 appropriate. Once a carbon developer, final parcels, and actual leases are identified, DNR will
3 consider individual leases. At that time, once the site-specific facts are known, Plaintiffs may
4 participate in public comment, challenge the leasing decision, and argue that site-specific SEPA
5 review is required to disclose and analyze alleged negative environmental effects.

6 **A. The Project advances and is consistent with DNR’s constitutional mandate to**
7 **serve “all the people” and its common law duties to enumerated beneficiaries.**

8 Under the Washington State Constitution, article XVI, section 1, “[a]ll the public lands
9 granted to the state are held in trust for all the people.” This requirement constitutes a
10 “constitutional mandate that all granted public lands shall be held in trust for ‘all the people’ in
11 Washington.” *Conservation Nw. v. Comm’r of Pub. Lands*, 199 Wn.2d 813, 835, 514 P.3d 174,
12 186 (2022) (hereinafter *Cons. Nw. v. CPL*).

13 The Department must balance its obligations to “all the people” with common law duties
14 to provide benefits—either financial or other benefits—for enumerated beneficiaries. *Id.* at 833-
15 34. The Department must also comply with applicable law. *Id.* Thus, the Department manages
16 lands according to three overarching duties: 1) a constitutional mandate to serve all the people,
17 2) common law trust duties to benefit enumerated beneficiaries, and 3) compliance with
18 applicable law. In accomplishing this balancing, DNR has broad discretion. As observed by the
19 State Supreme Court, “[t]here appear to be myriad ways DNR could choose to generate revenue
20 from the state and forest board lands or otherwise put them to use for the benefit of the
21 enumerated beneficiaries.” *Id.*

22 While forestry is an important component of rural economies and State land management
23 and will remain so for the foreseeable future, it is not strictly legally required on DNR-managed

1 lands. The Department has no legal obligation to generate **any** revenue for enumerated trust
2 beneficiaries—it may generate some revenue from lands it manages “**or otherwise put them to**
3 **use for the benefit of the enumerated beneficiaries.**” *Id.* (emphasis added). The Department
4 thus has flexibility in its “exercise of its discretion to make state and forest board lands
5 productive properties,” and must only present a defensible position. *Id.* at 835. “If there is room
6 for two opinions, a court will not find arbitrary and capricious action even if the reviewing court
7 believes the agency's decision wrong.” *Id.* (quoting *Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus*, 135 Wn.2d
8 582, 598, 957 P.2d 1241, 1249 (1998)).

9 Provided it includes an adequately articulated rationale, the Department could defensibly
10 elect to remove lands from logging entirely to provide non-financial benefits to the people of
11 Washington and enumerated beneficiaries. *See, e.g.*, RCW 79.10.210 (“the department is
12 authorized to identify and to withdraw from all conflicting uses at such times and for such
13 periods as it shall determine appropriate, limited acreages of public lands under its
14 jurisdiction”).¹

15 But the Project falls well short of removing lands from production. It includes leases of a
16 modest portion of DNR-managed lands for money that will flow to enumerated beneficiaries and
17 preserve the forests as both assets and environmental benefits. The Project generates revenue,

18
19
20
21
22 ¹ Defendant-Intervenors provide argument and citation to respond to Plaintiffs’
23 characterization of the common law trust duties. Plaintiffs tellingly do not assert in their
24 complaint or in their briefing that DNR’s decision to lease up to 10,000 acres of its forests to a
carbon credit program violates a fiduciary duty DNR owes to its beneficiaries.

1 provides environmental benefits, and preserves forests for potential future uses including
2 possible future logging. Given these many benefits and the Department’s reasonable rationale
3 supporting the Project, it is clearly within the scope of the Department’s constitutional and trust
4 obligations and authorities.

5 **B. The Project complies with the Department’s statutory obligations.**

6 Plaintiffs argue that the Department’s decision to defer 10,000 acres of forested trust
7 lands violates the statutes that commit the Department to calculating and generally adhering to
8 sustainable harvest strategies. Pls.’ Br. at 24 (citing RCW 79.10.310–330). The Plaintiff’s
9 argument is essentially that the Department has a statutory duty to log all available acres of
10 forest, including the 10,000 acres that are part of the Project, on the schedule that the Plaintiffs
11 would prefer. But the sustainable harvest statutes do not create an affirmative duty to carry out
12 any given amount of logging. Rather, the sustainable harvest statutes are planning provisions
13 that require calculation of a sustainable harvest level, and adjustment of that level as necessary to
14 accommodate changes in policy or conditions. RCW 79.10.320. The statutes prohibit
15 unsustainable logging, through overly rapid or overly extensive harvest. In other words, they
16 dictate a ceiling, not a floor. They do not set a minimum amount of logging, and certainly do not
17 require logging on all available Department managed forests.

18 Under the plain language of RCW 79.10.320, the Department has discretion to determine
19 which forests are “primarily valuable for the purpose of growing forest crops on a sustained yield
20 basis.” *Id.* As a corollary authority, the Department thus has the authority to determine that
21 some forests are **not** “primary valuable” for logging. As the Department makes these
22 determinations, it may adjust the sustainable harvest level. *Id.* Under established Department
23 policy, the determination of sustained yield is flexible based on region and conditions. REC

1 1189. The Department’s decision that certain ecologically valuable forests are most valuable for
2 carbon credit generating leases over the next 40 years is well within the Department’s obligations
3 under the sustainable harvest statutes.

4 The Department possesses express statutory authority to adjust the sustained yield as
5 necessary to reflect its determination of which forests are primary valuable for growing forest
6 crops: “[t]o this end, the department shall periodically adjust the acreages designated for
7 inclusion in the sustained yield management program and calculate a sustainable harvest level.”
8 RCW 79.10.320. Likewise, the Department has statutory authority and an established policy in
9 place to adjust the subsequent sustainable harvest level to account for arrearage—forested acres
10 slated for logging that were not harvested. *See* RCW 79.10.330; REC 1185-86.

11 Indeed, the record reflects that the decision to not pursue certain acres regularly occurs.
12 The Department regularly determines whether certain parcels are logged on shorter or longer
13 rotations, the design and scope of any timber harvest, and whether certain parcels are best
14 reserved from logging in response to site-specific considerations and operational constraints,
15 such as geologic hazards, protection of water bodies, community concerns, or access issues. *See*
16 REC 887; REC 1185-86. These decisions are all within the broad discretion of a land manager.
17 In the prior sustainable harvest calculation, the Department envisioned extensive logging in
18 riparian buffers. During the subsequent years, the Department determined that logging these
19 acres was challenging and expensive. As a result, it elected not to log those acres of riparian
20 forests. REC 841-42. This decision was an appropriate exercise of the Department’s discretion,
21 not a violation of the sustained yield statutes.

22 To further understand the sustained yield statutes, it is appropriate to look to “the context
23 of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a

1 whole.” *State v. Larson*, 184 Wn.2d 843, 848, 365 P.3d 740, 742 (2015) (citation omitted). In
2 this broader statutory scheme, numerous statutes undermine Plaintiffs’ contention that the
3 sustainable yield statutes mandate logging on their preferred rotation cycle on all available lands.

4 As is the case here, the Department may lease lands for virtually any purpose. RCW
5 79.13.010 (“the department may lease state lands for purposes it deems advisable, including, but
6 not limited to, commercial, industrial, residential, agricultural, and recreational purposes in order
7 to obtain a fair market rental return to the state or the appropriate constitutional or statutory trust,
8 and if the lease is in the best interest of the state or affected trust.”); RCW 79.22.050 (leasing
9 authority for state forestlands). RCW 79.10.120 authorizes a broad variety of multiple uses other
10 than logging. RCW 79.10.210 authorizes designation and full withdrawal of public lands from
11 management for scientific or other purposes of public benefit.

12 There is no statutory authority supporting the proposition that the Department must log
13 all its lands, and extensive statutory authority supports the Department’s broad authority to
14 pursue multiple uses. Those uses include deferring logging on a modest subset of public lands in
15 order to generate revenue through carbon credits.

16 **C. Plaintiffs’ SEPA arguments fail.**

17 Plaintiffs raise a series of SEPA arguments, which fall into three categories. First,
18 Plaintiffs contend that DNR did not adequately consider various impacts of the Project
19 (Plaintiffs’ Issues 1-3, 6). Second, Plaintiffs argue that DNR did not perform adequate site-
20 specific disclosure or analysis (Plaintiffs’ Issues 3-4). Third, Plaintiffs assert that purely
21 economic impacts to public services constitute environmental effects under SEPA (Plaintiffs’
22 Issue 5). Each argument, and the related sub-arguments, is unsupported by the SEPA statute,
23 regulations, and caselaw, and therefore fails.

1 **1. DNR adequately considered impacts to the environment, and SEPA does not**
2 **provide a forum to impose policy preferences.**

3 The central question in SEPA analysis is whether the agency adequately disclosed and
4 considered probable adverse effects to the environment. “In passing SEPA, the legislature
5 expressed ‘the clear aim of injecting environmental awareness into all levels of governmental
6 decision-making.’” *Wild Fish Conservancy v. Washington Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife*, 198 Wn.2d
7 846, 855, 502 P.3d 359, 364 (2022) (citing *Columbia Riverkeeper v. Port of Vancouver USA*,
8 188 Wn.2d 80, 104, 392 P.3d 1025 (2017) (Stephens, J., dissenting)). A review of the record
9 must show that “environmental factors were considered in a manner sufficient to amount to
10 prima facie compliance with the procedural requirements of SEPA.” *Chuckanut Conservancy v.*
11 *Dep’t of Nat. Res.*, 156 Wash. App. 274, 286-87, 232 P.3d 1154 (2010) (quoting *Juanita Bay*
12 *Valley Cmty. Ass’n v. City of Kirkland*, 9 Wash. App. 59, 73, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973)).

13 As summarized in *Wild Fish Conservancy v. Washington Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife*, 198
14 Wn.2d at 872–73:

15 SEPA does not demand any particular substantive result in governmental decision
16 making.” *Stempel v. Dep’t of Water Res.*, 82 Wn.2d 109, 118, 508 P.2d 166
17 (1973). Instead, SEPA “‘is an attempt by the people to shape their future
18 environment by deliberation, not default.’” *Sisley*, 89 Wn.2d at 89, 569 P.2d 712
19 (quoting *Stempel*, 82 Wn.2d at 118, 508 P.2d 166). SEPA demands a “thoughtful
20 decision-making process” where government agencies “conscientiously and
21 systematically consider environmental values and consequences.” *ASARCO*, 92
22 Wash.2d at 700, 601 P.2d 501; *SETTLE*, *supra*, § 3.01[2], at 3-4.

23 We assess the validity of an agency's threshold determination by determining
24 whether the environmental factors were “evaluated to such an extent as to
constitute prima facie compliance with SEPA procedural requirements.” *Hayden*
v. City of Port Townsend, 93 Wn.2d 870, 880, 613 P.2d 1164 (1980), overruled on
other grounds by *Save a Neighborhood Env’t (SANE) v. City of Seattle*, 101
Wash.2d 280, 676 P.2d 1006 (1984). We also consider whether the decision to
issue an MDNS was “based on information sufficient to evaluate the proposal's
environmental impact.” *Anderson*, 86 Wash. App. at 302, 936 P.2d 432. However,
“[a]n agency does not have to consider every conceivable environmental impact

1 when making its threshold SEPA determination.” *PT Air Watchers*, 179 Wash.2d
2 at 932, 319 P.3d 23; WAC 197-11-060(4)(a) (SEPA requires consideration of
3 environmental impacts, “with attention to impacts that are likely, not merely
4 speculative.”).

5 Thus, the question is not whether the agency got the answer right, but rather whether the
6 agency adequately considered the relevant factors and made a threshold determination
7 that was supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous.

8 Plaintiffs raise various policy concerns with carbon friendly forestry and carbon markets.
9 They assert that not logging forests increases fire risks, that selling carbon credits increases net
10 emissions, and that it is environmentally preferable (and not incidentally, more profitable for
11 industry plaintiffs) to perform intensive logging on public lands and store carbon in lumber
12 products. Each of these arguments is substantively wrong and has been widely debunked by
13 experts. *See, e.g.*, REC 14466 (recommending “higher carbon storage and timber yields in
14 extended rotations compared to business as usual, with modest wood premiums and/or carbon
15 incentive payments needed to close the financial gap between extended rotations and business-
16 as-usual”); REC 14470 (“Strategies in this region involve a combination of preserving old forests
17 where they exist and increasingly managing public forests toward these conditions.”).

18 More importantly, Plaintiffs arguments are irrelevant and misplaced here because there
19 will be no actual change from the status quo on the ground—the forests that are leased will
20 simply be allowed to grow, with non-harvest management continuing. Projects that do not
21 actually deviate from the baseline and impact the environment do not have “probable significant
22 environmental effects,” and thus cannot necessitate a determination of significance. *See* WAC
23 197-11-330 (threshold determination). In administering SEPA, Washington courts regularly
24 look to NEPA caselaw. *See Kucera v. State, Dep’t of Transp.*, 140 Wash. 2d 200, 216 n. 10, 995

1 P.2d 63, 72 (2000). The Ninth Circuit has determined that “[w]hen we consider the purpose of
2 NEPA in light of Supreme Court guidance on the scope of the statute, we conclude that an EA or
3 an EIS is not necessary for federal actions that conserve the environment.” *Douglas Cnty. v.*
4 *Babbitt*, 48 F.3d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995). The same principle applies under SEPA.

5 Even if there were environmental impacts of the Project, each of Plaintiffs’ arguments
6 were raised in comment letters and adequately considered by DNR in its environmental review.
7 The administrative record reflects that the agency considered and provided rational responses to
8 each of Plaintiffs’ concerns. *See* REC 30-70 (response to comments). DNR’s Project is part of
9 its broader strategic plan, REC 3286, and is based in part on third-party assessments
10 recommending DNR to participate in carbon markets, *see* REC 17536-60. These documents are
11 all part of the administrative record and substantiate the adequacy of DNR’s environmental
12 review.

13 **2. DNR correctly carried out SEPA at the earliest possible time and Plaintiffs’ site-**
14 **specific concerns are premature.**

15 In furtherance of its planning goals, SEPA requires that “[t]he SEPA process shall be
16 integrated with agency activities at the earliest possible time to ensure that planning and
17 decisions reflect environmental values, to avoid delays later in the process, and to seek to resolve
18 potential problems.” WAC 197-11-055(1). Accordingly, “agencies should adopt procedures for
19 environmental review and for preparation of EISs on private proposals at the conceptual stage
20 rather than the final detailed design stage.” WAC 197-110-055(4). SEPA provides for review of
21 “non-project actions,” which consist of “adoption of any policy, plan, or program that will
22 govern the development of a series of connected actions.” WAC 197-11-704(2)(b)(iii).

1 Black letter SEPA caselaw supports early environmental planning. Under *King Cnty. v.*
2 *Washington State Boundary Rev. Bd. for King Cnty.*, 122 Wn.2d 648, 663, 860 P.2d 1024, 1033
3 (1993) and progeny, “[o]ne of SEPA's purposes is to provide consideration of environmental
4 factors at the earliest possible stage to allow decisions to be based on complete disclosure of
5 environmental consequences... When government decisions may have such snowballing effect,
6 decisionmakers need to be apprised of the environmental consequences before the project picks
7 up momentum, not after.”

8 Performing environmental review early, in accordance with SEPA, presents tradeoffs in
9 that the precise details may not yet be known. The SEPA statute and regulations take into
10 account these tradeoffs and favor conceptual, early environmental review at a programmatic
11 level. This early implementation of SEPA is essential to fulfill the statutory mandate to “insure
12 that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values will be given appropriate
13 consideration in decision making along with economic and technical considerations.” RCW
14 43.21C.030(b).

15 While Plaintiffs critique the Department for not disclosing and analyzing site-specific
16 effects, the Department appropriately and lawfully elected to consider environmental effects at
17 the earliest possible time, for the non-project action. WAC 197-11-055(1). This is particularly
18 appropriate here, where the timing, location, and extent of the Project remains uncertain. Indeed,
19 the Notice of Final Determination for the Project is dated October 26, 2022, and there is no
20 indication that the Project has moved forward. There are still no specific leases.

21 Plaintiffs will be able to address any site-specific concerns when those areas are
22 identified. In the future, if the Department decides to lease identified parcels, that decision will
23 be subject to criteria. DNR must determine that the leases “obtain a fair market rental return to

1 the state or the appropriate constitutional or statutory trust, and if the lease is in the best interest
2 of the state or affected trust.” RCW 79.13.010(1), RCW 79.22.050. That decision is subject to
3 review by constitutional writ of certiorari or other writ procedure. *See, e.g., Hood Canal Sand &*
4 *Gravel, LLC v. Goldmark*, 195 Wn.App. 284, 310, 381 P.3d 95, 109 (2016).

5 Plaintiffs will also have the opportunity to argue that specific future carbon credit leases
6 should require additional SEPA review. Leases are generally categorically exempt from review
7 under SEPA, WAC 197-11-800(5)(c), in legislative and regulatory recognition that leases
8 generally lack significant environmental effects. However, that exemption is subject to a
9 significant exception. The exemption only applies to “[l]easing, granting an easement for, or
10 otherwise authorizing the use of real property when the property use will remain essentially the
11 same as the existing use for the term of the agreement.” WAC 197-11-800(5)(c). In addition to
12 challenging the leases themselves under numerous Washington statutes, Plaintiffs are free to
13 argue at a site-specific level that the use for carbon storage and sequestration is not “essentially
14 the same as the existing use,” and that further site- specific SEPA review of a proposed future
15 lease is required. Plaintiffs may also argue that additional information necessitates revisiting the
16 programmatic SEPA review for purposes of leases. WAC 197-11-335.

17 In sum, DNR correctly and lawfully conducted environmental review at the conceptual
18 stage, at the earliest possible time. Plaintiffs’ site-specific challenges are premature, speculative,
19 and unfounded. If leases occur, Plaintiffs can raise their concerns then.

20 **3. SEPA is an environmental statute that does not require analysis of economic**
21 **impacts.**

22 SEPA—the State **Environmental** Policy Act—is an environmental statute. RCW
23 43.21C.030 sets forth the core procedural requirements of SEPA. The sole focus on

1 environmental values is unmistakable. Each agency must “[u]tilize a systematic,
2 interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences
3 and the environmental design arts in planning and in decision making which may have an impact
4 **on the environment.**” RCW 43.21C.030(a)(emphasis added). The core principle of SEPA is
5 that “[t]he legislature recognizes that **each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to**
6 **a healthful environment** and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the
7 preservation and enhancement of the environment.” RCW 43.21C.020(3)(emphasis added).

8 Plaintiffs rely on the regulatory definition of “elements of the environment,” which
9 includes “Public services and utilities.” WAC 197-11-444(2)(d). However, this consideration
10 applies to imposition of impacts on those services, and does not extend to purely economic
11 budgetary and financial considerations. “It is well established that purely economic interests are
12 not within the zone of interests protected by SEPA.” *Kucera v. State, Dep't of Transp.*, 140
13 Wash. 2d 200, 212, 995 P.2d 63, 70 (2000) (citing *Snohomish County Property Rights Alliance*
14 *v. Snohomish County*, 76 Wash.App. 44, 52–53, 882 P.2d 807 (1994)). In *Kucera*, the State
15 Supreme Court allowed property owners’ SEPA claims to proceed with respect to the impacts of
16 the Chinook ferry wake because “their SEPA claim is based on the State's alleged failure to
17 consider the *environmental* effects of the Chinook, not its *economic* effects.” *Id.* (emphasis in
18 original).

19 There are good policy and practical reasons for this limitation. The legislature passed
20 SEPA to “insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values will be given
21 appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic and technical considerations.”
22 RCW 43.21C.030(b). Economics and revenue considerations already drive government decision
23 making, and in this context, there are already statutory provisions in place to require fair market

1 value to be achieved. *See* RCW 79.13.010. SEPA’s purpose is to give consideration to the
2 environmental impacts of decisions which might otherwise be ignored.

3 As a practical consideration, if SEPA applied to purely economic impacts, every budget,
4 contract, tax, or salary decision of a State or local government agency would require
5 environmental review. This is plainly not SEPA practice, and if it was, would be completely
6 untenable and grind government to a halt. The SEPA statute and regulations must be interpreted
7 to avoid such absurd results. *See Samish Indian Nation v. Washington Dep't of Licensing*, 14
8 Wash. App. 2d 437, 444, 471 P.3d 261, 265 (2020).

9 Finally, even if economic impacts analysis was required, Plaintiffs’ concerns are
10 premature. As set forth *supra*, the Project remains at the conceptual stage. Individual leases
11 have not been identified. When they are, the location and terms of the leases will be determined.
12 As of yet the economic impacts are unknown and speculative. The leases will generate some
13 revenue, and the forests at issue will remain available for potential logging after the leases are
14 completed. It may well be that leasing provides a more consistent and preferable financial
15 benefit to public services, or that the combination of leasing and later logging generates more
16 overall revenue. But at this time, those impacts are unknown and not susceptible to review.

17 IV. CONCLUSION

18 The Department has clear constitutional, statutory, and common law authority and
19 discretion to enter into leases to generate carbon credits. The Department conducted a thorough
20 analysis of the relative carbon benefits of carbon credit programs compared to logging and was
21 clearly within its discretion to conclude that a limited carbon credit leasing program was in the
22 best interests of the public and enumerated beneficiaries. The Department’s modest carbon
23 leasing program will cause no changes from the status quo on the ground, has no significant

1 environmental effects, and the determination of non-significance was not clearly erroneous.
2 Plaintiffs' appeal should be denied and the Department's decisions affirmed.

3
4 Respectfully submitted this 18th day of March, 2024.

5
6 ZIONTZ CHESTNUT

7 

8
9

Wyatt F. Golding, WSBA No. 44412
Ziontz Chestnut
2101 Fourth Avenue, Suite 1230
10 Seattle, WA 98121
wgolding@ziontzchestnut.com
11 (206) 448-1230 | Phone
12 (206) 448-0962 | Fax

13 WASHINGTON FOREST LAW CENTER

14 

15
16

Peter Goldman, WSBA No. 14789
Washington Forest Law Center
17 4132 California Ave SW
Seattle WA 98116
18 pgoldman@wflc.org
19 (206) 223-4088 | Phone

20 Attorneys for Intervenors


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing document to be served on all parties or their counsel of record on March 18, 2024, as follows:

<p>David O. Bechtold Douglas J. Steding Northwest Resource Law PLLC 71 Columbia Street, Suite 325 Seattle, WA 98104 dbechtold@nwresourceclaw.com dsteding@nwresourceclaw.com ghibbard@nwresourceclaw.com kwilliams@nwresourceclaw.com ehinkes@nwresourceclaw.com</p> <p>Attorneys for Plaintiffs</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid <input type="checkbox"/> Certified Mail Postage Prepaid <input type="checkbox"/> State Campus Mail <input type="checkbox"/> Hand Delivered <input type="checkbox"/> ABC Legal Messenger <input type="checkbox"/> FedEx Overnight <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Email, with prior written consent</p>
<p>Adrienne Smith Phil Ferester AGO Public Lands & Conservation Division PO Box 40100 Olympia, WA 98504-0100 adrienne.smith@atg.wa.gov phil.ferester@atg.wa.gov RESOLyEF@atg.wa.gov Ben.Welna@atg.wa.gov Anne.Caulder@atg.wa.gov Kiani.Tarape@atg.wa.gov</p> <p>Attorneys for Defendants Washington State Department of Natural Resources and Kristen Ohlson-Kiehn</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid <input type="checkbox"/> Certified Mail Postage Prepaid <input type="checkbox"/> State Campus Mail <input type="checkbox"/> Hand Delivered <input type="checkbox"/> ABC Legal Messenger <input type="checkbox"/> FedEx Overnight <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Email, with prior written consent</p>

I certify under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the state of Washington, that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED this 18th day of March, 2024, at Seattle, Washington.



Wyatt Golding, WSBA #44412